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The Inadequacy of Fiscal Constraints as a
Substitute for Proportionality Review
An Act Concerning Prison Overcrowding, Pub. Act No. 04-234,
2004 Conn. Acts 982 (Reg. Sess.).
The Constitution does not prohibit "everything that is intensely
undesirable."' In particular, Justice Scalia argues, the Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit disproportionately long prison sentences.2 Yet Scalia
seems to offer some consolation to those who worry about the "intensely
undesirable" prospect of disproportionate punishments: He implies that the
cost of incarceration acts as a check on the length of prison terms, a check
loosely standing in for proportionality review.3 Thus, Scalia tenders an
economic rationale for his contested interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment. Unfortunately, his rationale is faulty.
Fourteen years after Harmelin v. Michigan, Scalia's allusion to the
costs of incarceration seems prescient: Grappling with budget deficits, state
legislators across the country have indeed attempted to save money by
curtailing the growth of their prison populations.4 However, this wave of
1. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 986 n.11 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (upholding a
mandatory life sentence for possession of 672 grams of cocaine pursuant to a Michigan statute).
2. Id. at 962. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the parts of the opinion in which Justice
Scalia argues that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality principle. The Amendment
states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."
3. Id. at 978 n.9.
4. For a comprehensive review of such laws in the 2003 legislative sessions, see JON WOOL
& DON STEMEN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CHANGING FORTUNES OR CHANGING ATTITUDES?:
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS REFORMS N 2003 (2004), available at
http://www.vera.org/publication-pdf/226_43 l.pdf. "In addition to continued cutting of
administrative costs, more than 25 states took steps to lessen sentences and otherwise modify
sentencing and corrections policy .... Id. at 1. The Vera Institute of Justice also convened a
symposium of state legislators to discuss current policy challenges and the political climate
surrounding them. See ROBIN CAMPBELL, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, DOLLARS & SENTENCES:
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legislation does not support Scalia's further suggestion that the costs of
imprisonment should allay concern about disproportionate sentences.5 This
Comment examines one typical response to rising prison costs,
Connecticut's Act Concerning Prison Overcrowding.6 The Act trimmed
small amounts of time served for a large number of incarcerated people,
without altering the statutory penalty for any particular crime. Such laws
are common because they quickly reduce corrections costs without making
legislators appear "soft on crime." But, written to control the aggregate time
served in states' prisons, they neither purport to address nor in effect do
significantly alter the proportionality of individual sentences. Thus,
although Scalia correctly posited the existence of fiscal limits to
incarceration, he erred in asserting that fiscal considerations might obviate
the need for proportionality review.
This Comment does not attempt to resolve the debate among legal
historians about the existence of a proportionality principle in the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause. But it does refute the hypothetical
rationalization Scalia offers to support his interpretation of the Founders'
intent over that of the dissenters. Part I sets forth the relevant portion of
Scalia's argument in Harmelin. Part II discusses the Connecticut Act, a
representative example of states' attempts to reduce prison costs. Part III
debunks Scalia's reasoning in Harmelin and concludes that fiscal checks
are not a substitute for proportionality review.
I
Justice Scalia proposes in Harmelin that the cost of incarceration
relieves the judiciary from scrutinizing the proportionality of prison
sentences. Part of his argument is that the difference in adjectives among
the Excessive Fines, Excessive Bail, and Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clauses signifies that while excessive fines and bail are barred, excessive
punishments are not; the Framers "chose, for whatever reason, not to
include within [the Eighth Amendment] the guarantee against
disproportionate sentences that some State Constitutions contained."7 The
LEGISLATORS' VIEWS ON PRISONS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE BUDGET CRISIS (2003), available at
http://www.vera.org/publicationi-pdf/204_-398.pdf.
5. This Comment leaves aside federal sentencing laws, in part because the budgetary
considerations at the federal level are so different from those of the states.
6. An Act Concerning Prison Overcrowding, Pub. Act No. 04-234, 2004 Conn. Acts 982
(Reg. Sess.).
7. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 985. The central contention of Justice Scalia's opinion, which Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined and with which Justice Thomas has since voiced his agreement, see
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 32 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring), is that the Clause does not
bar excessively long prison sentences because, although such sentences may be cruel,
imprisonment is not an unusual punishment per se, see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967. After arguing
that the Framers did not intend that the Amendment should encompass a proportionality principle,
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scant legislative history of the Amendment' is silent on this "choice," and
Scalia delves extensively into the history of the equivalent provision in the
English Declaration of Rights to make his argument. 9 However, he
acknowledges that some historians, cited by the dissenters,' ° disagree with
his interpretation that both the English and American provisions exclude a
proportionality principle for prison sentences. 1
In the context of seeking "the most plausible meaning"' 2 from this
conflicted history, Scalia posits a reason of his own for why the Founders
might have intentionally excluded a proportionality principle from the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. He asks rhetorically, "[W]hy
would any rational person be careful to forbid the disproportionality of
fines but provide no protection against the disproportionality of more severe
punishments?"1 3 His response: "Imprisonment, corporal punishment, and
even capital punishment cost a State money; fines are a source of revenue.
As we have recognized in the context of other constitutional provisions, it
makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when the State
stands to benefit."1 4 Note the illogical gap between Scalia's common-sense
notion and the use to which he puts it: Courts should scrutinize the
government "more closely when the State stands to benefit"; therefore, it
,'makes sense" to give no scrutiny to the length of prison sentences.
Although this reasoning is not crucial to Scalia's argument against
proportionality review, it is his only explanation for why the Framers might
rationally have chosen to impose a proportionality requirement for bail and
fines, but not for punishments.
The idea that courts should scrutinize the government more closely
when it stands to gain financially evidently appeals to jurists. Justices
id. at 966-85, Scalia asserts that "proportionality does not lend itself' to an analysis using
"relatively clear historical guidelines and accepted practices that enable judges to determine"
which sentences are proportionate, id. at 985 (emphasis omitted). In contrast, Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, concurring in the judgment, crafted from the Court's precedents a test to
strike down "extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime," id. at 1001
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted), but did not find Harmelin's to be
such a sentence, id. at 1001-05.
8. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979 (opinion of Scalia, J.). There are only two short comments
in the congressional record. Legislators objected, first, ironically, that the Amendment's language
was "too indefinite" and, second, that although the Amendment "seems to express a great deal of
humanity," it "seems to have no meaning in it" because "we ought not to be restrained from
making necessary laws" until such time as "a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring
others from the commission of it could be invented." I ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (Joseph Gales, Sr.
ed., 1789). It was nevertheless "agreed to by a considerable majority." Id.
9. The Amendment's language and syntax come from the English Declaration of Rights of
1689. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966. Scalia also draws on the state ratifying conventions, state
constitutions, and early judicial decisions. Id. at 979-85.
10. Id. at 1010, 1011 n.I (White, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 974-75, 981 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
12. Id. at 977 n.6.
13. Id. at 978 n.9 (paraphrasing Justice White's dissent).
14. Id. at 979 n.9.
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Kennedy and Souter have both since quoted Justice Scalia's footnote, 5 and
lower courts frequently cite it when reviewing the proportionality of fines
or when commenting more generally on the government's financial
incentives.16 But Scalia moves one step further in proposing that financial
disincentives might justify the nonexistence of scrutiny of the length of
prison sentences. A recent wave of fiscally driven legislation aiming to
reduce prison populations refutes this notion that fiscal pressures can
replace proportionality review by the courts.
II
State legislatures have indeed passed laws to reduce the size or growth
of their prison populations in recent years. During 2003 alone, more than
half the states passed such laws, changing rules on probation and parole
violations; expanding early release programs; and, in a few states, repealing
mandatory minimums or otherwise reducing sentences.1 7 Empirical and
anecdotal evidence suggests that these changes have come about primarily
due to state budget crises.'
8
Following years of growth in Connecticut's incarcerated population, 9
15. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 114 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); United States
v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 56 (1993) (Kennedy, J.).
16. See, e.g., United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 984 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 39 (2d Cir. 1992); People v. $1,124,905
U.S. Currency, 685 N.E.2d 1370, 1391 (Il1. 1997); One (1) Charter Arms, Bulldog 44 Special,
Serial #794774 v. State ex rel. Moore, 721 So. 2d 620, 624 (Miss. 1998).
17. WOOL & STEMEN, supra note 4, at 1. The survey found that six states made changes to
their laws on technical probation and parole violation to facilitate release, id. at 6; eleven states
"expanded emergency and early release mechanisms," many of which apply only to low-level or
drug offenders, id. at 5; one state, Iowa, "decreased the amount of time violent offenders are
required to serve from 85 to 70 percent" of their sentences, id.; and five states repealed mandatory
minimums or otherwise reduced sentences, but only for drug offenses, id. at 7.
18. See CAMPBELL, supra note 4; RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS POLICY IN AN ERA OF FISCAL RESTRAINT
(2002), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/9091.pdf, WOOL & STEMEN, supra
note 4; see also Michael Vitiello, California 's Three Strikes and We're Out: Was Judicial
Activism California's Best Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1025, 1101 & n.614 (2004)
(mentioning various fiscally motivated proposals for scaling back or repealing California's three-
strikes law). But see WOOL & STEMEN, supra note 4, at 14 ("[W]hile the budget crises are
providing the occasion for change, the reforms are often anchored in changing attitudes and
philosophy."). It is difficult if not impossible to separate the waning of the crack cocaine and other
drug epidemics (and the corresponding reduction in public outcry) from the budget crises in
analyzing recent changes in drug sentencing; clearly both factors are important. Even the
Michigan statute at issue in Harmelin has been amended: In 1998, the Michigan legislature moved
to an optional rather than a mandatory life sentence and, in 2002, raised the triggering quantity
from 650 to 1000 grams. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 333.7403(2)(a)(i) (2004); see also Gary Heinlein,
Michigan Eases Drug Sentences; Judges' Discretion Replaces Mandatory Terms for Offenders,
DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 29, 2002, at Al (citing changing views on the efficacy of the policy, the
waning of the crack epidemic, and prison overcrowding as causes of the change).
19. Between 1992 and 2003, the average number of people confined in Connecticut
institutions rose by eighty-two percent. KEVIN P. JOHNSTON & ROBERT G. JAEKLE, AUDITORS OF
PUB. ACCOUNTS, STATE OF CONNECTICUT: PERFORMANCE AUDIT: ALTERNATIVE
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20the legislature passed the Act Concerning Prison Overcrowding last year.
Styled as a budgetary measure,2' the Act focuses on the administration of
parole and other forms of supervised release, but it excludes any
consideration of the sentences for individual crimes.
The law's primary effect is to make the granting of parole and pardons
more efficient. A reorganized Board of Pardons and Paroles is charged with
implementing, inter alia, a "parole orientation program for all parole-
eligible inmates" and an "incremental sanctions system for parole violations
including, but not limited to, reincarceration. ''22 It also requires the Board to
hold hearings for all eligible inmates and to "articulate for the record the
specific reasons why such person and the public would not benefit" when it
denies parole in any case.23
The law also increases the number of people eligible to be released to
alternative forms of state supervision. It authorizes the Board to transfer
parolees to a "halfway-house group home or mental health facility, or to an
approved community or private residence" eighteen months before their
release date,24 and authorizes the Department of Correction to release to an
"approved residence" people incarcerated pretrial on most charges
categorized as class D felonies or misdemeanors.25 And the law creates
"compassionate parole release" for people "physically incapable of
presenting a danger to society" who have served at least half of their
sentences.26
In addition to these immediate changes, the Act calls for a legislative
study of the fiscal impact of mandatory minimum sentences 27 and requires
both the Department of Correction and the judicial branch to devise plans to
INCARCERATION 16 (2003), available at http://www.state.ct.us/apa/pdf2003/
Alternate%20lnc%20P302-P-03.pdf. Between July and December 2002, thirteen of twenty
Connecticut state prisons reported being over capacity during the entire period or for more than
half the time. Id. at i.
20. 2004 Conn. Acts 982.
21. The bill sent to the Senate from the House began, "Passage of the bill results in
significant costs and savings primarily related to increasing the supervision of offenders in the
community and decreasing the incarceration of certain offenders." H.R. 5211, 2004 Gen. Assemb.
(Reg. Sess.) (Conn. 2004).
22. § l(e)(1)-(2), 2004 Conn. Acts at 985.
23. Id. § 3(d)-(e), 2004 Conn. Acts at 987-88. Previously the Board was required only to
report regularly the number of eligible inmates not paroled.
24. Id. § 9, 2004 Conn. Acts at 990-9 1.
25. Id. § 10, 2004 Conn. Acts at 991.
26. Id. § 28, 2004 Conn. Acts at 1000. The provision does not apply to people convicted of
capital felonies. Id.
27. Id. § 22, 2004 Conn. Acts at 997-98. Since the Act's passage, the General Assembly has
not altered mandatory minimums, which are "specified in only a few instances" in Connecticut;
most crimes carry only maximum sentences. Michael Lawlor, Reforming Mandatory Minimum
Sentences in Connecticut, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 10, 14 (2002). Mandatory minimums include
one year for a third conviction of driving under the influence, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227(g)
(2003), and five years for the selling of certain quantities of drugs by a non-drug-dependent
person, with departures for minors or those with impaired mental capacity, id. § 21 a-278.
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"reduce by at least twenty percent" the number of people serving time for
technical parole violations, the largest category of inmates.28
The Act does not alter the penalty for any crime and, therefore, does not
directly affect the proportionality of sentences under law. Moreover, it does
not link reductions to differences in culpability among people who have
committed the same crime, which might indirectly improve the
proportionality of sentences. For instance, a legislature might save money
by codifying further mitigating factors to be considered in sentencing. If the
Act does mitigate any disproportionate sentences, 29 it mitigates them only
indirectly and incompletely, by releasing offenders on parole earlier.
Though a far less onerous form of state supervision than imprisonment,
parole's restrictions nevertheless carry the potential penalty of
reincarceration.
III
Connecticut's Act Concerning Prison Overcrowding, and the wave of
laws of which it is a part, illustrate the political and economic reasons why
fiscal limits are an inadequate substitute for proportionality review. Put
simply, trimming small amounts of time from many offenders' time served
or reducing administrative inefficiencies enables legislators to save money
without exposing themselves to the political cost of reconsidering sentences
for individual crimes. The result is that these broad-based but shallow
reductions affect the proportionality of penalties only for those crimes
whose sentences are short in the first place. A reduction of a few months
changes only negligibly the proportionality of sentences measured in years
or decades. Such shallow cuts are the result of at least three factors
influencing legislatures.
First, the legislative budget cycle imposes fiscal disincentives to cut
long prison sentences. Making small reductions in the sentences for the
most common crimes or easing the parole-granting process for all offenders
translates into substantial and calculable gains in the short term-the
relevant period for legislators under pressure in a fiscal crisis. 30 The need
28. § 26, 2004 Conn. Acts at 999. Parole violations without underlying criminal charges
account for thirteen percent of the prison population. CONN. DEP'T OF CORR., ANNUAL REPORT
2002-2003, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/lib/doc/PDF/PDFReport/
annualreport2003.pdf.
29. A review of the proportionality of sentences in Connecticut is beyond the scope of this
Comment. Connecticut is arguably less likely than other states to mete out disproportionate prison
sentences. See Lawlor, supra note 27, at 13-14 (citing, inter alia, Connecticut's lack of elected
judges or law enforcement officials and its extensive system of alternatives to incarceration as
reasons the state was amenable to granting judges limited discretion in nonviolent drug cases).
The Connecticut Act is nevertheless typical. See supra note 17.
30. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 4, at 7-8 (quoting an Iowa legislator saying that "[elven
shortening a term two, three, or four months is going to have a pretty significant impact over at
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for immediate fiscal returns thus greatly diminishes the present value of
long-term savings to be gleaned from larger cuts in longer sentences. 31 It
also renders less attractive measures like increasing the mitigating factors
that a judge might consider in sentencing; while such a measure would link
reductions in incarceration to the culpability of offenders, it would yield
less predictable savings and would not effect an immediate release of
prisoners. We see these preferences borne out in legislation across the
country. In 2003, for instance, at least thirteen states either instituted "back-
end sentence adjustments" to shorten inmates' time served or, like
Alabama, bolstered their parole-granting administration "with the goal of
expediting the release of... low-level felony offenders. 32
Second, the high political cost of reducing criminal penalties deters
legislators from reducing prison sentences in general and makes reducing
the sentences for some crimes almost impossible. According to the chair of
Connecticut's House Judiciary Committee, the Act's relatively easy
passage33 was possible only because of strict budgetary constraints and
because the Act completely eschewed changing the sentences for individual
crimes; the sentences for violent crimes, in particular, are "untouchable. 34
Indeed, a group of victims' rights advocates supported the Act on the
ground that releasing low-level drug offenders freed resources for
incarcerating perpetrators of violent crimes.35
Third, a related force acting on legislators is the fear of a recidivism
scandal. The impact of Willie Horton on the 1988 presidential race looms
large,36 and fear predisposes legislators to release only those offenders
least a couple of year period"); Andy Furillo, Early End to Parole Seen as Cost Savings,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 13, 2004, at Al (reporting California's short-term fiscal needs and the
possible savings from an early-release measure).
31. See WOOL & STEMEN, supra note 4, at 6-7 (citing the fear that "promised cost savings
from reducing sentences are either illusory or will only be realized too far in the future" as a
common concern among legislators who considered but did not pass reductions in sentences for
individual crimes). As one might expect according to this analysis, the most recent reduction in
notoriously lonig sentences-the reduction of some penalties under New York's draconian
Rockefeller drug laws in December 2004-was, according to some observers, the result primarily
of advocacy by sentencing reform proponents rather than of fiscal need. See Michael Cooper, New
York Votes To Reduce Drug Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004, at Al (discussing the long
battle over the changes in the legislature and not mentioning budgetary considerations).
32. WOOL & STEMEN, supra note 4, at 5.
33. A commentator noted that "the 'prison overcrowding' bill sailed through the General
Assembly this session, with bipartisan good cheer and support .... [P]risons are more expensive
than tuition at Harvard; and there is no more room in the inn." Laurence D. Cohen, Op-Ed, Too
Many Prisoners Today, Too Much Crime Tomorrow, CONN. L. TRIB., May 17, 2004, at 23.
34. Telephone Interview with Michael P. Lawlor, Connecticut State Representative (Nov. 16,
2004).
35. Id.; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 4, at 11. For a discussion of the role played by
victims and their advocates in the criminal justice system, see Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in
American Penal Law: A Systematic Overview, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 3, 30-31 (1999) (describing
the "remarkably successful" victims' rights movement but questioning how much "symbolic
reforms" like constitutional amendments and victims' bills of rights can accomplish).
36. See STEVE TAKESIAN, WILLIE HORTON: TRUE CRIME AND ITS INFLUENCE ON A
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whose recidivism poses the least risk of inspiring popular backlash. 37 The
reductions produced by such risk calculations might indeed correct
disproportionate sentences if the short sentences of less "risky" offenders
are nevertheless disproportionately long. But insofar as such risk analyses
simply gauge how politically savory a particular reduction will be--or how
large the political backlash might be-they are the product of the very
influences that produce disproportionately long sentences in the first place
38
and will tend to perpetuate disproportionality.
This Comment has argued that the misguided economic speculation in
footnote nine of Harmelin cannot support Justice Scalia's interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment. Due to financial efficiency and political
expediency, fiscal checks will not prevent lengthy disproportionate
sentences. The importance of this observation lies in Scalia's complete
repudiation of proportionality review, despite conflicting historical
evidence. The scant legislative history does not clearly reveal the Founders'
intent in phrasing the Eighth Amendment as they did. What is clear,
however, is that we cannot rely on Scalia's incorrect rationalization as a




37. See CAMPBELL, supra note 4, at 8 (reporting state legislators' fear of backlash).
38. In Ewing v. California, for instance, where a divided Court upheld California's three-
strikes law as not "grossly disproportionate," Justice O'Connor discussed how the murder of
twelve-year-old Polly Klaas "galvanized support" for Proposition 184, which enacted the three-
strikes law and was "the fastest qualifying initiative in California history." 538 U.S. 11, 14-15, 30
(2003). Justice Breyer and three other dissenters argued at length that the statute violates the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 35-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also VINCENT SCHIRALDI ET AL.,
JUSTICE POLICY INST., THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF
3-STRIKE LAWS 10 YEARS AFTER THEIR ENACTMENT (2004), available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/downloads/JPIOUTOFSTEPREPORTFNL.pdf (arguing that
California's is a uniquely harsh three-strikes law). In 2004, California voters defeated Proposition
66, which would have required that the second and third triggering strikes be serious or violent
crimes, despite the fact that the proposition's ballot summary stated that it would produce "[n]et
state savings of potentially several tens of millions dollars initially, increasing to several hundred
million dollars annually." OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL
ELECTION: NOVEMBER 2, 2004, at 44 (2004), available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/
english.pdf. A month after the election, in another attempt to cut costs, California's Board of
Corrections began considering a policy change of the broad and shallow sort, shortening parole
for "parolees convicted of less-serious, nonviolent crimes who have been trouble-free for a full
year." Furillo, supra note 30.
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